belonging • gary e. davis • berkeley


	Project	a preson-al humanity

	belonging gary e. davis	August 30, 2025

Identifying with others, things, conceptions, and (generally) phenomenality (presence) derives from early attachment, relating, and inter-relating—feeling
in flow with being, flow of inter-ness—which I call interality.

Primal, then primary (selfidentical) valuing of inter-ness feels to be belonging.
It is belonging of Self (wholly, at first) with [inter]presence: others, things, conceptions, etc. Comfort and confidence of belonging is a common feeling.

At first (primally), everything is personified, being an extension of oneSelf, gradually differentiated during early childhood as Self-differentiation (which isn’t yet S/s differential, done at best in early adolescence), which gradually learns how the other is itself (other Self) in inter-Selfal relating (deep friendship, authentic intimacy).

Selfidentity emerges from childhood, relative to other persons such that oneSelf is increasingly relative to the differentiated person-ality of the other person as proper identity of oneself relative to others.

Interality of oneSelf (early childhood) becomes largely interpersonal such that oneSelf is increasingly one self interpersonally, interpersonal selfidentity. Interpersonalization of oneSelf increasingly differentiates itself from itSelf (non-consciously) as outer-oriented self-differentiating interpersonal life (not yet S/s differentiated), as identity is interpersonalized as selfidentity distinct from other persons having identities, not yet differentiating the other as implied mystery of its self (p/s differentiation) apart from “our” relations.

The other is no one else other than whom they are to “us.” A person variably belongs with others—feeling “like me,” but nebulously, curiously, not as if me. Other personal identities aren’t relative to oneself, but relative to “our” rela-
tions, which are relative to one’s interpersonalized selfidentity. (Traditionally, this has been understood as sociocentric intersubjectivity, but it’s really interpersonal relative to a self: one’s enactively receptive and responsive, interest-prevailing engaging—drawn by aspirations and preferences—relative to other persons.)

Increasingly, oneself is s/p-differentiating as individuation enriches feeling for being a life apart from any other interpersonal relation. Other persons have differentiated belonging with “me”—as being in “our” same interpersonal belonging (family relations, friendship, casual acquaintance, shared play, shared project), while good individuation is increasingly apart from any others (more-defined s/p differentiation), yet gaining more interpersonal relations as one’s domain of life grows in selfidentical aspiration, purposiveness, and lifeworldly understanding of everyone and everything, always being oneSself drawn further into individuation relative to maturing one’s way to distinct S/s differentiation in adolescence, thus better capability for appreciating others as singular persons. (That's a long sentence. I don’t expect this view of individ-
uation to be appealing or obvious, but I would argue that understanding individuation in this differentiating way is better than not doing so.)

No wonder persons easily confuse boundaries: at risk of being too presump-
tuous or too “distant,” relative to any two modes of belonging.

An actively differentiating selfidentity (implicitly Sselfidentical) also belongs with others by default (from early attachmental life onward: remaining in pro-
cesses with affective results), but increasingly belongs with others by choice. Belonging by choice might result by separate choice (e.g., a game or organ-
ization) or mutual choice (e.g., friendship, avowed solidarity). The difference was discussed earlier.

Each kind of belonging involves elective affinities (preferences, strength of bonding) by varying degrees across choices, e.g., preferring choices which express kinship over choices which express solidarity (i.e., preferring long-term friends to casual friends). OneSself is valuationally felt (singularly embodied in one’s time) relative to innumerable unshared values (A-Project-ive life) as well as innumerable shared values of belonging, by choice and by default.

Belonging with others genuinely presumes being trusted and trusting that candor will be received in good faith. A continuum of belonging involves varying degrees of trust, needed for intimacies, merely desired for casual relations, less wanted for formal relations (e.g., organizational life), more wanted for very interpersonal relations (e.g., shared engagement in a vulnerable project).

Good_ individuation of oneSself comfortably masters more-differentiated life: self in relation with/to (irw/irt) interpesonal life; self irw/irt S/s differentiation —in-divid-uality: differential cohering, identity-in-difference. Thereby, a good_ path of life becomes more and more wholly one’s own in a widening flexibility of being in the world (more than of the world) as one’s own sense of future and own legacy of experience, valuing, and understanding.

Relative to standard developmental modeling of interpersonal relations as pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional (Kohlberg), good_ individ-
uation of oneSself may become singularly post-“post-conventional,” because Sselfidentity may become no longer relative to conventionality as merely be-
yond conventionality in some indeterminate, “post-conventional” sense. Rather, a person may gain a flexibility among merely post-conventional understandings which is unusually, highly re-adaptive, creative, and (perhaps) exemplary (protean).

Some of the distinctions above are ordinary, maybe all, to some persons. But it’s common to have nebulous senses of them; and common to have a weak sense of belonging to whatever differences are evident.

For instance, regarding one’s Self as wholly about what’s unconscious (exclusion of dissonant experiences) is unwittingly excluding non-conscious capacity for Self-reflective learning, maybe to belong better with adaptable capabilities or to enhance potential for scaling aspirations, or for better appre-
ciating memories, enhancing free relations with good_ habits, and re-adapting.

Better appreciation of real and potential distinctions enhances capability for flexible perspectivity and flexible adaptability in more-complex environments, thus possibly appreciating their better appeals, better values, and better under-
standings—more-complex beauties, goods, and validities. Higher appreciability gains more wealth of being.

Of course, the articulable scale of oneself belonging in the world of one’s life (lifewold) varies immensely among persons; and varies across eras of a life (normal developmental “stages”). Explicit senses of belonging (solidarities, friendship, kinship, family, intimacy) live with implicit senses of belonging (aspirations, appreciations, engagements, remembrance, etc.), as well as with exclusions (implicit and explicit displacements, suppresions, repressions [i.e., forgotten suppressions]). A given scale of belonging is always a mix of default (inherited, assimilated) and chosen scale, variably relevant irw situational want.

Yet, there is the better scale of belonging: Relatively higher scale is clearly better than relatively lower for situational appreciation. Far-term valuing (e.g., A-Project-ive commitment) for orientation of near-term action is better than the converse (though the latter is vastly more common for ordinary life). Orientation by depth of understanding is better than orientation by superficial understanding. High valuation (e.g., selfidentical cherishing, sacredness, Value) is better than ephemeral valuation. A more-differentiated scaling is better than less. Appreciation of complexity affords more-flexible perspectivity.

For instance, consider the following two continua as somewhat intersecting
relative to situational relevance: (1) my pragmatically-differentiated primary Continuum: civility, solidarity, friendship, kinship, family, and intimacy; irw (2) the PCS continuum discussed earlier, thus intersectionally engaging…

psychalogical belonging relative to its lifeworld of variable engagement with all modes of the primary Continuum
interpersonal belonging relative to solidarity…family
cultural belonging relative to solidarity…family
conceptuality relative to solidarity and friendship (e.g., organizational life; academic discourse)
social belonging relative to solidarity and friendship
political belonging relative to civility and solidarity

But many continua (besides the two above) can be relevant to one’s oriental scales of belonging through individuation—through generative individuation
of self-enhancive differential appreciability of aptness (and inaptness), iso-
morphically extrapolating and interpolating aspects of relevance. Later, I will discuss isomorphic thinking (soon), generative individuation, and other continua.

Altogether, a life expresses Sselfidentical cohering which is drawn by its starring purposes to which oneSself belongs, in possiibly manifold flourishing of one’s times. Love of life can express any scale of preferred belonging or desired sophistication, any constellational scaling which prospects belonging
in Our evolving.

Flourishing has no ending, about which I’ve mused endlessly: as fulfilling enjoy-
ment, anticipating so many aspects, inviting conceptualities, generalizing to humanity, and musing mindfully.

So, an ecology of lifeworldliness can flower endlessly.

We can advocate that as a politics: how integral ecological thinking can be
to Our evolving; and how high-scale, highland flourishing deserves to be oriental for mindful life.

Yet, any basis for promising advocacy is at first always singular, a life (far
from political relevance), at best participating in person-al scaling (re: the PCS continuum as ecological) isomorphically across modes of being person-ally well (re: a primary Continuum).

I prefer that an ecology of Self prevails over day-to-day selfidentity. That’s congruent with artistic and scientific appeals.

I prefer that conceptual values orient my sense of cultural values, e.g., that futuring humanity orients our sense of humane days. That’s congruent with philological philosophy.

I prefer that social life orients political life, i.e., values of goodG society prevail in policies of governance.

next—> iso-belongng