When do A and B belong together? • gary e. davis • berkeley


	Project	chosen belonging irt choosing to belong

	When do person A and person B belong together? gary e. davis	December 5, 2024

Suppose that ‘A’ and ‘B’ refer to persons.

Here, “A = B”—or A and B belong together in the same relevant way—means that either [1] two persons (named A and named B) are in the same condition of relevance; or [2] an earlier presumption that B is someone other than A is false. For [2], different appearances are of the same person; e.g., one author wrote two very different kinds of text. There is a differene between two authorships which result from the same author (which is not uncommon). Or one instance of a person was a disguise (e.g., for a theatrical performance). Multiple per-
sonae, same person; or multiple [inter]personal relations (e.g., parent and professionist), same self.

But let’s assume that A and B are different persons. The string ‘A = B’ indicates that persons A and B are in a relation of sameness, in all relevant respects. For example, both are equally competent. We don’t use the equals sign, of course, but the notion of coming to be the same in belonging is how being relevantly equal pertains to persons.

But who says? If their sameness of belonging together precedes them (e.g., professional peer evaluation standards), then that specific belonging defines their relevant relation to each other. They didn’t choose to belong equally. Rather, it’s the case that they are relevantly the same, belonging equally rela-
tive to given conditions of evaluative relevance applied equally, one presumes. A and B participate in the relations of relevance preceding them and are equally instanced. They’re regarded samely or evaluated in the same way, by the same process, to the same degree. Indeed, relative to the given process applied to each, there’s no difference in their degree of instantiation of relevance. They’re the same in all relevant repsects, subject to the same process which derives their equal value.

Naturally, two persons may have the same parents, thereby belonging to a process of parenting which precedes them and defines them as both siblings of the same parenting process. That’s a de-personalizing way of regarding them, but it’s common to joke (or not) that one didn’t choose their parents. Or a per-
son didn’t choose their genome or their body (though a person may choose to make healthy choices or to fashion one’s “look”). Being subject to “nature” is being subject to “logical” processes which may be controlled or not.

On the other hand, A and B may have chosen to be in relation with each other or with anyone else, in solidarity, in friendship, in intimacy. They separately chose to be relating and belong relative to a self-giving degree of relating. They chose to belong. They each decided (or can decide) that they are to belong in the same relationship; or that each belongs (or can, in principle, belong) to any relationship.

Person A and person B create their relation of relevance to each other. The relation “A belongs with B” is valid because A and B separately decided to make a relation such that “A belongs with B” is true by choice.

A and B have agency relative to a relevant giving way to relating. The relation of relevant sameness is not given apart from there being A or B. Intelligent selection is beyond natural (and logical) selection by subjection to process.

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