Project	chosen belonging irt choosing to belong

	identity and difference gary e. davis	December 5, 2024

In the first kind of case previously (given belonging), being relevantly the same (“=”) precedes there being “A” and “B” in any relevant relation. The two are brought into relation by derivation. In the second kind of case, “A” and “B” pre- cede (give belonging to) there being a valid use of ‘being relevantly the same.’ The two bring themselves into relating. Clearly, the logical relation, when applied to persons, conceals there being a per- son apart from the relationship, brought to each as homogenously relevant, i.e., having no being apart from that which brings each into a derived relation. Their self-relevance apart from interpersonal relation doesn’t exist for the process which involves them. Self-relevance is impossible for variables, of course; but persons are often regarded as variables. When persons regard themselves relative to interpersonal relations, they give prevailing importance to that disposition of identity, as if their belonging pre- ceded their choice; but that is their choice; for example: taking for granted their relationship (“It’s just the way we are”); or believing that “we were meant to be together.” A common source of misunderstanding is that one takes the relation- ship for granted (maybe to a co-dependent degree) and the other does not. In co-dependence, one feels to be the other as much as one can feel being oneself. That inhibits possible revision (or ending) of the relationship. Persons who regard themselves relative to their independent lives (the simple fact of having a singular individuation of talents, interests, opportunities, etc.) give prevailing importance to selfidentity apart from interpersonal relations. This should seem obvious. But commonly in the hunan sciences (as Europeans say), sociality is thought to prevail. (In the U.S., there are “social” sciences counterpointed by “behavioral” sciences, in each case dominated by statistical accessibility). Scientific understanding of persons is standardly relative to their social (“subjective,” ergo intersubjective) being. Commonly in social sciences, agency is socialized, such that non-casual (or extra-ordinary) life is derivative of sociocentric processes. But a person always has agency apart from interpersonal presence. One may give preference to oneself relative to interpersonal relations; or give preference to interpersonal relations relative to oneself. But the former isn’t necessarily ego- centric. And the later is not, at heart, sociocentric, because interpersonal relations are, in pricniple, always unique (richer than “social”), whereas sociality is an extrapolation, a generalization (a derived mode) of interpersonal aspects of personal life scaled up/out, whereas oneSself can be scaled in/down. Obviously, each person is more than their interpesonal relationships, as these come and go through the years, while each person remains the same lifepsychality in their singular lifecycle. Even intimates, who would regard their relation as inter-Selfal (or interpsychal), came into their bond from separate backgrounds, already invested in an ownmost sense of lifecycle. An interpsychal intimacy doesn’t (or shouldn’t) wholly define the Sselfidentity of a person, no matter how intimate is “our” interality—“shouldn’t,” because individuational flourishing has (or should have) its ownmost singularity (future-oriented sense of being); “should have,” because desire for selfidentity is integral to being a person, born with self-enhancive interest, already in early days fascinated, curious, and hungry for ex- perience which becomes, at best, flexibility and resilience relative to changes of one’s times. Indeed, a life (lifepsychality, lifecycle) is composed of many interpersonal rela- tions, which can’t be understood socially because composite identity is self-iden- tically situating itself in [inter]personal relations. Sociocentric thinking conceals the unique selfidentical agency of one’s own array (“thick,” near-and-dear) of interpersonal engagements. Sociocentrism dilutes interpersonal agency through trait generalization, variably (if not statistically) instanced.

next—> Being merely social

 

Be fair. © 2024, gary e. davis